

US investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (not cited by Kiessling) in 2015, which showed that US officials had worked closely with Pakistan's military and intelligence services to remove Bin Laden.

Kiessling could also have done more to analyse the motives of Generals Ashfaq Kiyani and Shuja Pasha (heads, respectively, of the army and the ISI at the time of Bin Laden's killing). For with hindsight it appears they had calculated that, on balance, it was better for the military high command to shoulder the blame for incompetence in failing to safeguard the country's borders against a US raid than to be accused of being complicit with the Americans at a time when anti-US sentiment (much of it fed by the military establishment itself) was running high in Pakistan. The gamble clearly paid off. For in the ensuing controversy over Bin Laden, public anger in Pakistan was indeed more violently directed against the United States for apparently violating Pakistan's sovereignty than against the military or its intelligence agencies for refusing to account for their alleged role in protecting Bin Laden or cooperating with the Americans. It is no coincidence that the so-called 'Memogate affair', which was orchestrated by the ISI and its military masters, should also have erupted at precisely the same time. Intended to fuel public concern about alleged attempts by Pakistan's elected government to compromise the country's sovereignty with the help of US support, it has since been regarded as no more than a ploy that aimed to side-step vital questions of military accountability in favour of spurious concerns over national sovereignty.

That said, this contribution unquestionably extends our understanding of the ISI and its role in shaping Pakistan as we know it. With his privileged access to key personalities in the ISI and first-hand knowledge gained from almost fifteen years spent living in Pakistan, Kiessling's insights into one of the world's most secretive organizations are unlikely to be surpassed any time soon.

Farzana Shaikh, Chatham House, UK

East Asia and Pacific

Taiwan's China dilemma: contested identities and multiple interests in Taiwan's cross-strait economic policy. By Syaru Shirley Lin. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 2016. 282pp. Index. £74.00. ISBN 978 0 80479 665 1. Available as e-book.

In early 2017 Taiwan is back in the news in ways no one quite expected, as a result of the telephone call between then US President-Elect Donald Trump and Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen at the beginning of December 2016. This has the potential to change US-China and cross-strait relations in fundamental ways. But underlying this is a long-standing structural dilemma for Taiwan, explored in dynamic detail in a new book by Syaru Shirley Lin.

As Lin puts it at the start of the concluding chapter, Taiwan 'relies economically on a partner it does not trust and that poses an existential threat' (p. 206). Given this, the puzzle that Lin sets out to address is why, over the last couple of decades, Taiwanese policy towards economic interactions with (mainland) China has oscillated between the restrictive and the liberalizing. This cannot be explained by looking at external economic factors, though Taiwan's 'China dilemma' is similar in some ways to those of other small economies in an era of globalization. Neither does Taiwanese politics on its own provide an answer: under Democratic Progressive Party President Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), who had previously advocated independence for Taiwan, policy moved in first a liberalizing and then a restrictive direction.

Lin's approach is to explain these shifts through a detailed historical account which weaves together perceptions of national interest across growth, stability, equity and security with what she calls the 'emergence and consolidation' of Taiwanese national identity. This is examined in four phases, each characterized by a key government slogan: 'no haste, be patient' (1996), 'active opening, effective management' (2001), 'active management, effective opening' (2006), and 'prosper again', which deals with the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and other liberalization policies from 2010.

Over this period, polls showed a fairly clear emergence of a Taiwanese identity, a decline in 'Chinese identity' and a growing preference for status quo futures which would preserve Taiwan's autonomy and separateness from China. The outcome, Lin argues, was a consolidation not around ethnic identity or origin (earlier residents of Taiwan had distinguished between *waishengren* and *benshengren*, meaning those from outside Taiwan and those indigenous to it), but around residence in Taiwan and commitment to its institutions and values, in particular its democratic political system. Once this identity had been consolidated, a 'Taiwan first' consensus across the two major political parties meant that the debate over liberalization was one which was no longer intertwined with questions about Taiwanese identity, but focused on questions of economic growth and security, as well as equity.

The book is well argued and carefully researched, bringing together the details of the politics and economic policy debates relating to identity. There are industry case-studies, including in the semiconductor industry, a vital part of Taiwanese business for much of the period under study. As well as addressing the particular question of cross-strait economic policy, the book therefore serves as a useful general introduction to Taiwan's politics and economy from the 1990s onwards.

It could be argued that the idea of 'consolidating' national identity is somewhat too teleological. But Lin also acknowledges 'the possibility that national identity could reemerge as a political issue' (p. 220), though she sees significant change as unlikely. It remains to be seen whether any changes in policy under Tsai Ing-wen or under the new US administration might lead that judgement to be revisited in the years to come. Meanwhile, Taiwan's fundamental 'China dilemma' looks set to remain.

Tim Summers, Chatham House, Hong Kong

China's foreign policy: challenges and prospects. By Joseph Yu-shek Cheng. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company. 2016. 630pp. Index. £104.00. ISBN 978 9 81471 902 5. Available as e-book.

China's foreign policy is somewhat of a hot topic and much has been published on it in recent years. However, Joseph Yu-shek Cheng's 630-page anthology offers readers little new insight. The volume boasts 15 chapters and a rather unwieldy and ineffectual introduction. Of the 15 chapters, 13 have been published before in one form or another, including one that was originally published in 1989. The first part of the book follows the trajectory of China's foreign policy from the 1970s into the 1980s and the 1990s. The argument is uncontroversial. At some point the Chinese leadership decided to move away from Mao's revolutionary conceptions and embrace a pragmatic—and independent—foreign policy. My difficulty with the 'historical' part of the book is that it fails to take advantage of the enormous literature, much of it based on declassified documents, memoirs and other primary sources, which emerged since the articles first appeared. Cheng's insights are still valuable, but primarily as an example of how political scientists thought about China many years ago, rather than for what they tell or fail to tell us about Beijing's foreign policy calculus.